Metacognition of Concepts


  1. Travers, E., Frith, C. D. and Shea, N. (forthcoming) ‘Learning Rapidly about the Relevance of Visual Cues Requires Conscious Awareness’, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology [pre-print pdf]
  2. Shea, N. and Frith, C. F. (2016) ‘Dual-Process Theories and Consciousness: The Case for “Type Zero” Cognition’, Neuroscience of Consciousness  [open access pdf] [link]
  3. Shea, N., Boldt, A., Bang, D., Yeung, N., Heyes, C. and Frith, C. D. (2014) ‘Supra-personal cognitive control and metacognition’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18(4), pp. 186-193 [open access pdf] [link]
  4. Shea, N. (2014), ‘Using Phenomenal Concepts to Explain Away the Intuition of Contingency’, Philosophical Psychology 27, 4, pp. 553-570 [pre-print pdf] [link]
  5. Shea, N. (2012), ‘Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(2), pp. 307-344 [open access pdf] [link]
  6. Shea, N. and Bayne, T. (2010), ‘The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61, 459-484 [open access pdf] [link]
  7. Shea, N. and Heyes, C. (2010) ‘Metamemory as evidence of animal consciousness: the type that does the trick’, Biology & Philosophy 25, 95-110 [open access pdf] [link]
  8. Shea, N. (2003) ‘Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental?’, Philosophical Quarterly, 53, 201–213 [pdf] [link] [Jstor]