Metacognition of Concepts

Mental representation

 

  1. Shea, N. (2019) ‘Functionalist Interrelations Amongst Human Psychological States Inter Se, ditto for Martians’, in Smortchkova, J., Dolega, K., Schlicht, T. (eds.) What Are Mental Representations? (Oxford: OUP) [pre-print pdf]
  2. Shea, N. (2018) ‘Metacognition and Abstract Concepts’ Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B [open access pdf] [link]
  3. Shea, N., Godfrey-Smith, P. & Cao, R. (2017) ‘Content in Simple Signalling Systems’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science [open access pdf] [link]
  4. Shea, N. (2016), ‘Representational development need not be explicable-by-content’, in Vincent C. Muller (ed.) Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (Springer: Synthese Library), pp. 221-238 [pre-print pdf]
  5. Shea, N. (2015), ‘Distinguishing Top-Down From Bottom-Up Effects’. Perception and Its Modalities. Biggs, S., Matthen, M. & Stokes, D. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 73-91 [pre-print pdf] [link]
  6. Shea, N. (2014), ‘Exploitable isomorphism and structural representation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64(2) [pre-print pdf] [link]
  7. Shea, N. (2014), ‘Reward Prediction Error Signals are Meta-Representational’, Nous 48, 2, pp. 314-341 [open access pdf] [link]
  8. Shea, N. (2014), ‘Neural signalling of probabilistic vectors’, Philosophy of Science [pre-print pdf] [link]
  9. Shea, N. (2013), ‘Naturalising representational content’, Philosophy Compass, 8(5), pp. 496-509 [open access pdf] [link]
  10. Shea, N. (2013), ‘Neural mechanisms of decision-making and the personal level’, in KWM Fulford, M Davies, G Graham, J Sadler, G Stanghellini and T Thornton (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry (OUP) [pre-print pdf] [link]
  11. Shea, N. (2013), ‘Millikan’s Isomorphism Requirement’, in D. Ryder, J. Kingsbury & K. Williford (eds.) Millikan and Her Critics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell) [pre-print pdf] [link]
  12. Shea, N., Krug, K. and Tobler, P.N., (2008) ‘Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making’, Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience, 8(4), 418-428 [published pdf] [link] [journal doi]
  13. Shea, N. (2007) ‘Consumers Need Information: supplementing teleosemantics with an input condition’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75(2), 404-435 [pre-print pdf] [link]
  14. Shea, N. (2007) ‘Content and Its Vehicles in Connectionist Systems’, Mind & Language, 22(3), 246-269 [pre-print pdf] [link]
  15. Shea, N. (2006) ‘Millikan’s Contribution to Materialist Philosophy of Mind’ (in French translation) Matière Première, Vol. 1, Feb 2006, pp. 127-156 [pre-print pdf]
  16. Shea, N. (2013) ‘Perception vs. Action: the computations may be the same but the direction of fit differs’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(3), pp. 228-9 [pre-print pdf]
  17. Shea, N. (2011), ‘New concepts can be learned’, review essay on Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts (OUP, 2009), Biology & Philosophy 26, 129-139 [pre-print pdf] [link]
  18. Shea, N. (2011), ‘Acquiring a new concept is not explicable-by-content’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(3), pp. 148-149 [pre-print pdf] [pdf] [link]
  19. Shea, N. (2009) ‘Varieties of Meaning by R.G. Millikan’, Philosophical Review, 118(1), pp. 127 – 130 [pre-print pdf]
  20. Shea, N. (2005), ‘Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures by Ruth Millikan’, Quarterly Review of Biology, 80(3), p. 344 [link]
  21. Shea, N. (2003), ‘Functions in Mind by Carolyn Price’, Philosophical Quarterly, 53, pp. 129-132 [link]
  22. Shea, N. (2002), ‘Getting Clear About Equivocal Concepts: Critical Review of Millikan’s on Clear and Confused Ideas‘, Disputatio 13, pp. 34-47 [unedited draft]
  23. Papineau, D. and Shea, N. (2002) ‘Ruth Millikan’s On Clear and Confused Ideas‘, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2), pp. 453-466 [pre-print pdf] [link]